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Stylized facts about CCTs
1. Reduce poverty and inequality
2. Help households break the intergenerational 
transmission of poverty by promoting child 
health, nutrition and schooling
3. Impact is enhanced by targeting women
4. Have small effects on labour force 
participation and fertility 
5. Do not crowd out remittances
6. Conditionalities matter (?)
7. CCTs must be part of an integrated package 
of services
Why is SA an interesting case study?
 Very large cash transfer program
• Cash transfers make up 14% of the government 
budget
• More than one in four people receives a cash 
transfer and this number is rising
 These are unconditional cash transfers
 South Africa has good data so a lot or work 
has been done
Benefits are generous and coverage is high
 The Old Age Pension and Disability Grant are about 
PPP$230 per month (1.75 times median per capita 
income)
 The Child Support Grant is about PPP$55 per month 
(40% of per capita income)
 Foster Care Grant is about PPP$150 per month
 Grants are means-tested – about 85% of the elderly and 
three-quarters of children are income eligible.
Cash transfers to the elderly: value of the pension by 
race (2010 PPP$)
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
450
Whites
Coloureds & 
Indians/Asians
Africans
Cash transfers for children
Source: SOCPEN data
NUMBER OF CHILD GRANT BENFICIARIES, BY YEAR
March 2010:
9.5 million CSG
500,000 FCG
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1. The grants are pro-poor
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1. Cash transfers reduce poverty
 A crude “morning after” simulation suggests 
that if cash transfers were removed and 
households had no time to re-organise or 
change behaviour, poverty would rise from 
54% to 60%.
 Half of households in the bottom two quintiles 
report cash transfers as their main source of 
income. 
2. Cash transfers improve educational outcomes
 Edmonds (2006) finds that school attendance 
and completed schooling rise when there is a 
male of pension-age in the household
 Case and Ardington (2006) find that the 
presence of a female pensioner has a positive 
effect on enrolment and progression for 
maternal orphans
2. Cash transfers improve child nutrition
 Duflo (2003) (using 1993 data) found that the 
presence of a female pensioner increased the 
nutritional status of girls but not boys
 Ambler (2010) using 2008 data finds the same 
result.
 Aguero, Carter & Woolard find a positive effect 
on height-for-age if the CSG is received in 
sufficiently high dosage during the “nutritional 
window” before the child turns three.
 Duflo and Ambler’s results also support the idea 
that giving the cash to women enhances impact
4. Effect on labour supply? 
 Bertrand, Mullainathan, and Miller (2003) -
reduction
 Posel, Fairburn and Lund (2006) – increase
 Ardington, Case and Hosegood (2008) -
increase
 Ranchhod (2010) – reduction
 Williams (2009) [CSG] – increase
4. No obvious effect on (teen) fertilty
 3% of grant recipients are teenagers but 15% 
of babies are born to teens. 
 Teen fertility peaked in 1996 (before the 
introduction of the CSG) and has declined 
slightly since then
5. Do cash transfers crowd our remittances? 
Jensen shows that remittances are crowded out 
by cash transfers.
1997 2008
No-one employed, no remittances, no cash transfers 12 17
No-one employed, no remittances, cash transfers 18 25
No-one employed but receiving remittances 21 13
At least one employed person 49 45
Total 100 100
Household formation:
Employment has risen, yet there are more workerless 
households. Do the grants “empower women” or “fragment 
households”?
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The CSG is deliberately targeted at women
 Application procedure is simpler for mothers.
 Admin data from 2004 tells us that 99% of 
CSG recipients are women; recent household 
survey data tells a similar story. 
 Qualitative work by Hunter & Adato (2007) 
suggests that there are widespread 
perceptions that men are not entitled to apply 
for the CSG or that men find it demeaning to 
apply.  
Men and the Child Support Grant
As far as she knows they do not give the grant to men 
at the offices. If a man comes for an application he is 
told to bring along maybe a granny because he cannot 
receive the grant on behalf of a child, being a man. 
There were not many males and those that were there 
they were not talking. I do not know, maybe they were 
embarrassed by the fact that there were more females. 
It means it is the female thing.
(pay point observations, Adato and Hunter, 2007)
What happens to maternal orphans? 
Maternal orphan Paternal orphan Dual orphan Not an orphan
CDG 0.3 0.7 1.4 0.4
FCG 7.6 1.7 30.9 0.5
CSG 20.7 60.7 39.1 58.2
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Unintended consequences of the FCG
 The number of dual orphans in South Africa is 
expected to rise from 600 000 in 2008 to
1.2 million by 2015. 
 The Foster Care Grant is almost 3 times the 
size of the CSG and is not means-tested.  
 Surely a strong incentive to foster rather than 
adopt a child. 
Has evidence mattered for policy?  
“Recent survey data has provided clear 
empirical evidence of significant improvements 
in child nutrition associated with the child 
support grant, which in turn positively affect 
cognitive ability and school outcomes”
- 2006 Budget Speech
Could we have known more?
(1) In 2005, the Department of Social 
Development launched a panel survey of 
grant beneficiaries.
 After the first wave, a “control group” 
consisting of the next door neighbours of the 
grant beneficiaries was introduced.
 The data has yet to be released.
(2) In 2007, UNICEF offered TA to run field 
experiments on “CSG+” to support the 
discussions at that time about extending the 
CSG to older teens. 
At the inception of the CSG in 1998:
 Several conditionalities, including participation in 
“development programs” and proof that the child was 
immunised. 
 All conditions were dropped after a year after they were 
found to be unworkable and a barrier to take-up. 
To condition or not to condition?
2004 – Draft regulations to Social Assistance Act of 2002 
(conditions not included in final wording).
“A primary caregiver who is in receipt of a CSG must comply with the 
following criteria…”
• The child must have accommodation, be fed and clothed
• The child must receive immunisation and other health services
• The child, if of school-going age, must attend school regularly
• The grant must be used for the benefit of the child
Another attempt at conditions
‘Normative injunctions’ 
– not specified / 
measurable
Behavioural 
conditions
2009 – conditions in draft regulations
The issue of conditionality raised again in the context of 
preparations to extend the age threshold of the CSG from 15 to 
17. 
The draft regulations introduced a behavioural condition requiring 
proof of the child’s enrolment and attendance in school every six 
months.
If not enrolled in school or attended school irregularly, the CSG 
would be suspended and the caregiver would need to submit 
reasons explaining the child’s absence from school. 
If accepted as “reasonable”, then the CSG would be re-instated, 
but with no provision for back-pay for the ‘lost’ months when the 
CSG was suspended. 
Conditions in the context of age extension
Can enrolment really be increased? 
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2010 – final regulations
 Following submissions from researchers and children’s rights 
groups and civil society organisations, the conditions were 
softened – they remain in the regulations, but no sanctions are 
specified.
Settling on ‘soft’ conditions
We do know quite a lot about cash transfers in SA, but much less 
than one would hope to know about such a massive system.
The grants are clearly pro-poor and redistributive.
Despite the lack of behavioural conditions, the grants seem to 
have an impact on health and education outcomes.  
The ongoing discussions about introducing conditions are 
motivated by political economy concerns: “the poor must be seen 
to be doing their part”.  
Given the “rights based” approach to social security, it seems 
unlikely that there will ever be a serious attempt to impose 
conditions.
Conclusion
